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During the yellow fever epidemic in Angola in 2016, cases of yellow fever were reported in China for the first time. The 
11 cases, all Chinese nationals returning from Angola, were identified in March and April 2016, one to two weeks after 
the peak of the Angolan epidemic. One patient died; the other 10 cases recovered after treatment. This paper reviews the 
epidemiological characteristics of the 11 yellow fever cases imported into China. It examines case detection and disease 
control and surveillance, and presents recommendations for further action to prevent additional importation of yellow fever 
into China.
The 2016 yellow fever outbreak in Angola led to renewed attention to this often-fatal disease. Of the 4306 suspected cases reported, 376 
individuals died (mortality rate, 8.7%).1 The outbreak 
was declared to have been one of the largest and most 
challenging yellow fever outbreaks in recent years by 
the World Health Organization (WHO), in part because 
of its international spread to other countries, including 
China.
Yellow fever is a zoonotic disease that is endemic in 
tropical regions of Africa and South America. It is caused 
by the yellow fever virus, an arbovirus that belongs to 
the Flavivirus genus.2 The virus is transmitted between 
humans, or from monkeys to humans, through the bite 
of infected mosquitoes belonging to the Aedes and 
Haemogogus genera, respectively. Yellow fever causes 
an estimated 30 000 deaths each year, most of which 
are in Africa, where more than 500 million people are at 
risk for yellow fever.3 An additional 400 million people 
in Central and South America are also at risk.3 Though 
Aedes aegypti mosquitoes are found in China (primarily 
in Fujian Province) and other parts of Asia, yellow fever 
had never, before 2016, been reported in China or any 
other part of Asia.
In 2015, more than 200 000 Chinese nationals 
were working or conducting business in Angola.4 Accord-
ing to the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), dozens of the 
Chinese nationals in Angola contracted yellow fever 
during the 2016 outbreak, resulting in eight deaths in An-
gola.5 Facing the possibility of an imported yellow fever 
epidemic, China developed a national yellow fever control 
and prevention protocol,6 and took steps to strengthen 
surveillance at airports and health-care facilities and to 
implement emergency vector surveillance. Despite these 
efforts, 11 Chinese nationals who were infected during 
the outbreak in Angola imported yellow fever into China 
in 2016.
Evaluating the importation of yellow fever 
cases into China in 2016 and strategies 
used to prevent and control the spread of 
the disease 
Chao Li,a Dan Li,a Shirley JoAnn Smart,b Lei Zhou,a,c Peng Yang,d Jianming Ou,e Yi He,f Ruiqi Ren,a Tao Ma,g Nijuan 
Xiang,a Haitian Sui,a Yali Wang,a Jian Zhao,a Chaonan Wang,a Yeping Wang,a Daxin Ni,a Isaac Chun-Hai Fung,b 
Dexin Li,h Yangmu Huang,i and Qun Li,a
Correspondence to Qun Li (email: liqun@chinacdc.cn)
WPSAR Vol 11, No 2, 2020  | doi: 10.5365/wpsar.2018.9.1.007 https://ojs.wpro.who.int/2
Li et alEvaluating the importation of yellow fever cases into China
Data collection
Once a suspected case was diagnosed by a laboratory, the 
provincial CDC conducted a field investigation to collect 
demographic and epidemiological information (including 
travel history, i.e. the dates of arrival in Angola and return 
to China and yellow fever vaccination status) and clinical 
information (including symptoms, time of symptom onset 
and date of hospital visit).
Vector surveillance
Routine surveillance of Aedes density has been conducted 
in China for many years. According to the surveillance 
protocol,9 all provinces are classified into three groups 
(high, middle and low) depending on the level of risk of 
mosquito-borne disease transmission. In high-risk areas, 
surveillance is conducted throughout the year. In mid-
dle- and low-risk areas, surveillance is conducted from 
May to November and from June to September. After 
each of the imported cases of yellow fever was identified, 
emergency monitoring was conducted to measure the 
mosquito density within a radius of 200 metres of the 
patient’s residence. The Breteau Index (BI) was calcu-
lated to determine the number of positive containers per 
100 households inspected.9
Ethics approval and consent to participate
The case information was collected according to the 
regulations of the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases as 
a part of the emergency response, which was exempted 
from ethics approval and consent to participate.
RESULTS
Case characteristics
A total of 11 cases of yellow fever were reported in China, 
all imported from Angola. All were Chinese nationals liv-
ing in Luanda, the capital of Angola, at the time of the 
outbreak. Seven cases were residents of Fujian Province, 
two of Jiangsu Province, and one each of Zhejiang Prov-
ince and Sichuan Province. All cases were identified in 
weeks 11 to 15 of 2016, approximately one to two weeks 
after the peak of the Angolan epidemic. The patient age 
range was 18–52 years (median: 42 years). Eight were 
male, and three were female. Eight were retailers, and 
Considering frequent travel, labour relationships, 
and close trade with endemic countries in South America 
and Africa, China faces a continued risk of yellow fever 
importation. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to 
examine China’s response to the importation of its first 
yellow fever cases, particularly the emergency response, 
as well as case detection and disease surveillance and 
control.
METHODS
We obtained and analysed data collected as part of 
China’s emergency response. The following paragraphs 
describe the steps taken to identify and document the 
imported cases of yellow fever and to collect demo-
graphic and epidemiological data, as well as clinical 
information.
Case definition
Suspected cases of yellow fever were identified by clini-
cians based on clinical manifestations consistent with 
yellow fever, which included fever, jaundice, liver and 
kidney dysfunction, vomiting, and bleeding, as well as 
epidemiological history (i.e. history of travel or residence 
in the last 14 days before symptom onset). Confirmed 
cases were defined as suspected cases that tested posi-
tive for yellow fever virus using nucleic acid testing.6
Case discovery
Yellow fever cases imported into China were either 
discovered by AQSIQ staff during point-of-entry screen-
ing or later reported by treating health-care providers. 
Febrile passengers passing through the point of entry 
were identified via temperature screening and were 
transported to the hospital for diagnosis and treatment. 
Travellers with mild or moderate symptoms that had 
not been detected by entry screening were identified by 
health-care providers in hospitals while seeking medical 
care. Clinicians identified and documented symptoms 
consistent with yellow fever to identify suspected cases. 
When a suspected case of yellow fever needed to be 
confirmed, patient blood samples were sent to the pro-
vincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
for laboratory testing by real-time reverse transcriptase 
polymerase chain reaction (rRT–PCR).7 All information 
was reported to the local health administrative depart-
ments after disease confirmation.8
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Disease control and surveillance
The Chinese Government took steps to strengthen 
surveillance at airports and health-care facilities and im-
plemented emergency vector surveillance in an attempt 
to prevent further cases of yellow fever. Specifically, the 
Government intensified multisectoral coordination and 
collaboration; strengthened surveillance, vector monitor-
ing and risk assessment; enhanced clinical management 
of yellow fever cases; conducted vector control activities; 
carried out public risk communication activities; and de-
ployed a medical team to Angola to provide yellow fever 
vaccination to unvaccinated Chinese nationals.11
DISCUSSION
We describe the 11 cases of imported yellow fever in 
China, most of which were discovered within two weeks 
after the peak of the outbreak in Angola in 2016. After 
the outbreak in Angola was announced, China quickly 
released a protocol for yellow fever prevention and con-
trol.6 At the same time, AQSIQ, in the hope of preventing 
three were labourers. Ten reported having been bitten 
by a mosquito at least six days before symptom onset; 
the other patient (case no. 2) was unsure if he had been 
bitten. Six patients reported having received yellow fever 
vaccinations. Case nos. 6, 7, 9 and 10 were vaccinated 
less than 14 days before system onset. Case no. 8 was 
vaccinated in China five years before symptom onset, 
and Case no. 11 was vaccinated in Namibia 10 months 
before the onset of illness (Table 1).10
Case detection
Ten cases received medical treatment in Luanda but were 
not diagnosed with yellow fever; the other case, having 
only mild symptoms, did not seek medical treatment 
before returning to China. Seven cases returned to China 
through the Beijing Capital International Airport; the other 
four entered through Shanghai. Six cases were reported 
within the city of entry, and five were eventually reported 
in Fujian Province, where they had sought medical care. 
Of the six cases discovered by AQSIQ, two cases with 




















1 M 32 8 March 2016 Beijing Beijing Not vaccinated before symp-tom onset AQSIQ Died of the disease
10,19–
21
2 M 46 5 March 2016 Shanghai Shanghai Unknown AQSIQ  22
3 M 44 9 March 2016 Beijing Beijing Not vaccinated before travel to Angola AQSIQ  10,23
4 M 44 11 March 2016 Beijing Beijing Not vaccinated before travel to Angola AQSIQ  10,23
5 M 50 6 March 2016 Beijing Beijing Not vaccinated before travel to Angola AQSIQ
Received treatments in multi-
ple hospitals in Angola from 6 
to 16 March 2016 
10,24
6 F 42 11 March 2016 Fujian Fuzhou
Not vaccinated before travel to 
Angola. Vaccinated in Angola 




7 M 42 17 March 2016 Fujian Fuzhou Vaccinated 7 days before symptom onset
Medical 
Institution  10,26
8 F 36 15 March 2016 Fujian Fuzhou Vaccinated 5 years before symptom onset
Medical 
Institution  10,26
9 F 53 13 March 2016 Fujian Fuzhou Vaccinated 1 day before symp-tom onset
Medical 
Institution  10,26
10 M 18 12 March 2016 Fujian Fuzhou Vaccinated 10 days before symptom onset
Medical 
Institution  10,27
11 M 29 5 April 2016 Beijing Beijing Vaccinated 10 months before symptom onset AQSIQ
Sought medical care at a local 
hospital in Angola 10,11
AQSIQ, General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine.
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of imported cases of yellow fever
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ment, which would have provided valuable information 
for disease prevention. Required vaccination and im-
proved communication are also crucial for individual busi-
ness people who are travelling to yellow fever-endemic 
countries. All inbound passengers should be required to 
present proof of vaccination if they are arriving from yel-
low fever-endemic countries. Health education materials 
(e.g. videos, posters, warning signs, brochures and text 
messages) could be provided at the points of entry by 
inspection and quarantine officials to encourage inbound 
passengers to self-declare symptoms of a potential com-
municable disease.13
Additional strategies have been identified and are 
recommended for reducing the risk of importation and 
spread of infectious diseases in China. For instance, 
China could strengthen regulations and legislation to put 
an end to the fabrication of false yellow fever vaccination 
certificates, a practice used to circumvent the vaccina-
tion regulations of the International Health Regulations, 
or IHR (2005). Globally, governments, including that of 
China, could ensure their citizens receive yellow fever 
vaccination when travelling to countries that recommend 
it, could tighten border controls to ensure incoming 
visitors from yellow fever-endemic countries have proof 
of vaccination and could make public policies a priority in 
the prevention of diseases among travellers.14
The active period for the Aedes aegypti mosquito in 
Fujian Province was reported to be from May to October 
in 2016.15 However, the result of emergency monitor-
ing (BI: 15) indicated continued transmission risk of 
mosquito-borne diseases after the peak period. Thus, the 
public should be educated to eliminate containers that 
can hold water in which mosquitoes may breed.
Risk of disease importation
Due to frequent travel and close trade with yellow fever-
endemic countries in Africa and South America, China 
faces a continued risk of yellow fever importation as travel 
volume has increased. Travel patterns to and from yellow 
fever-endemic regions in relation to China indicate that 
Angola sends the second-highest number of travellers into 
China and also receives the second-highest number of 
Chinese visitors.14 During the years 2010–2030, tourist 
arrivals in Asia and the Pacific are expected to increase 
by 331 million, bringing the total number of tourists to 
about 535 million in 2030. With this increase in travel, 
yellow fever from entering China, issued an announce-
ment that included instructions for screening travellers 
and checking vaccination certificates.12
Several strategies were implemented to control 
the spread of yellow fever in China. First, all travellers 
from Angola were required to present yellow fever vac-
cination certificates. Those without a certificate were 
isolated at the point of entry or their place of residence 
for six days. Second, all travellers from affected countries 
were screened upon entry. Anyone who self-declared or 
who was suspected of having yellow fever was isolated 
at the entry point. There, AQSIQ staff administered an 
epidemiological survey and collected blood samples for 
testing. Third, travellers from Angola and other epidemic 
countries were required to perform self-health monitoring 
for six days after entering China. If suspicious symptoms 
occurred, the affected traveller was asked to report to 
a health-care provider, disclose their travel history and 
receive prompt treatment. Additionally, aircraft, contain-
ers and other cargo from the epidemic countries were 
targeted for mosquito control. It was also recommended 
that persons travelling to Angola and other epidemic 
countries should be vaccinated again for yellow fever be-
fore departure from China. For the imported yellow fever 
cases, emergent monitoring of mosquito-borne vectors 
was also performed.
Areas recommended for improvement include 
epidemic information sharing, risk warning and health 
education for Chinese nationals in Angola and other yel-
low fever-endemic countries. According to our investiga-
tion, Chinese nationals in Angola are generally employees 
sent by private companies or individual business people, 
primarily from Fuqing City in Fujian Province. More 
than 200 000 Chinese nationals live and work outside 
China,3 so timely health-related communication between 
health officials, companies and overseas workers could 
help protect China’s expatriate population from public 
health threats in their countries of temporary residence. 
Overseas workers in Angola should have received a yel-
low fever vaccination before their departure from China. 
Information about the yellow fever epidemic, if received 
from their companies or Chinese health officials, might 
have encouraged personal prevention measures such as 
mosquito-avoidance precautions. Information on travel-
lers with yellow fever, especially those who returned to 
China for treatment, should have been reported by the 
employing companies to the Chinese embassy or Govern-
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doses of the vaccine would be needed annually to cover 
the Chinese population travelling to yellow fever-endemic 
countries. Yellow fever 17D vaccine is manufactured in 
China for the domestic market and therefore is available, 
although the supply is limited.12
Routine vaccination for children living in countries at 
risk for yellow fever is also recommended by WHO.3 The 
vaccine confers long-term protection (10 years or more, 
possibly lifelong) within 10 days for more than 90–95% of 
individuals who receive the vaccine. Within 30 days after 
vaccination, 99% of those immunized develop immunity. 
A single dose is likely to provide lifelong immunity. The 
yellow fever vaccination certificate is now valid for the 
duration of the life of the person vaccinated.17
Among the 11 cases, there were two cases with 
vaccination failure. Although vaccination failure for yel-
low fever is unusual, some studies showed up to 26% 
seronegativity in vaccines after mass immunization cam-
paigns.18 External factors such as improper cold chain 
handling, storage and administration may be the cause 
of failure.
In conclusion, we have described the first-ever 
importation of yellow fever cases in China, discussed 
the methods used for case detection and prevention of 
imported infectious disease, and provided several recom-
mendations for disease prevention and control. Experi-
ences gained from the response to imported yellow fever 
cases in 2016 can be used to protect Chinese travellers 
from yellow fever and to prevent new importations of the 
disease.
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there will be a concomitant increase in the importation 
of infectious diseases. Due to the presence of the urban 
mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti, among large unvacci-
nated populations, 1.8 billion people in Asia were put at 
risk for yellow fever by international travellers during the 
2016 outbreak.14 In Angola, by September 2016, near the 
end of the 2016 yellow fever outbreak, 884 laboratory-
confirmed cases of yellow fever had been reported, with 
373 deaths. The confirmed cases of yellow fever in China 
were the first-ever cases to be imported into Asia.14
In 2012, a total of 475 761 air passengers travelled 
to China from yellow fever-endemic countries. Of those, 
195 291 travelled from the South American countries of 
Argentina, Brazil, Columbia and Venezuela, and 104 854 
travelled from the African countries of Angola, Ethiopia, 
Ghana and Nigeria. During that same year, 466 832 air 
passengers from China travelled to yellow fever-endemic 
countries. The importation of yellow fever from endemic 
countries by unvaccinated Chinese workers is a serious 
concern, as they are apparently able to circumvent the 
mandated IHR (2005) regulations that require proof of 
vaccination for entry into China from certain yellow fever-
endemic countries, including Angola.14
Vaccinations
Finally, although yellow fever is a vaccine-preventable 
disease, the vaccination rate of yellow fever in Chinese 
nationals in Angola is estimated to be very low.16 Vaccina-
tions should be required for all Chinese nationals going to 
or returning from countries where yellow fever is endemic, 
as per the WHO recommendations.11 This would protect 
Chinese citizens who are residing in countries such as 
Angola and Brazil, where the risk of contracting yellow 
fever is substantial.
The WHO risk assessment report of yellow fever 
infection in non-immunized travellers underlined the need 
to reinforce the implementation of yellow fever vaccina-
tion requirements and highlighted the risk of international 
spread of the disease through non-immunized travel-
lers.11 A safe and effective vaccine for yellow fever has 
been available for more than 50 years. The licensed, live 
attenuated yellow fever vaccine produces immunization 
within 10 days and has a long duration of immunity. 
However, it is in short supply, with only about 80 million 
doses produced annually. An estimated half a million 
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